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   The debate on orientalism has touched the field of philosophy. That is, it has stirred, to 
some extent, the common trend of the europeanization of philosophy. This paper will discuss 
the problem of the "orientalization" f Japanese philosophy in a much wider perspective. 
Specifically this will discuss how Europe, often identified with the "Western tradition, 
mistreated other traditions, in particular Japanese philosophy. It shall therefore touch upon 
the problem of the reinvention of the philosophical tradition. The position is therefore 
directed towards the familiar doubts as to whether the non-European streams of thought 
contain any "philosophy" at all. This question inevitably brings us to the relevant problem of 
the various ways in the search for Truth. I would like to touch upon two methods in the 
search for truth: the meditative-mystical and logical-discursive-rational ones. These seem to 
me decisive ways in approaching the relations and transreadings between the European and 
Japanese philosophical traditions. 
1) Is philosophy a European phenomenon, and what does it mean for "Japanese 
  philosophy" and its beginnings? 
   The above question could as well be asked in the following way: Is there anything like 
Europe or Asia (not to mention the misused "East" and "West" in this context) in the field of 
philosophy, and where does Japan stand in this distinction? 
   In today's philosphical world, although it often claims to be "global", we can still hear 
the voices arguing that philosophy is exclusively a European ("Western") phenomenon. When 
Nishi Amane introduced the streams of European philosophy (positivism and utilitarianism) to 
Japan, he himself must have believed that by doing this he was bringing to his country 
something that it lacked or needed for its salvation from the bondage to Neo-Confucianism. 
Nishi's great awakening (1) might have meant oo entering a dream even more decisive and 
tremendous than the former one, the belief that there was something superior in Western, 
European, ideas and its civilization, and that "the master key to Western culture could be 
precisely identified as a single discipline, namely philosophy. This discipline he first defined 
as ` the clarification ofwisdom and virtue"' (2), a science presumably sosuperior to anything 
Japan or even China with their Song philosophical tradition and its development i  Japan 
might have produced in the field. 
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   By the time Nishi was confronted and charmed by European philosophy, it had already 
been understood in Europe as a "European or Western enterprise"('), which has not been the 
case throughout the history of European philosophy. Therefore Nishi saw in Europe also 
Japan's Other, at the time of Japan's growing awareness and perception of the West. If we 
look at the European philosophical moment, and especially at Nishi's insight into it, we 
understand that what he perceived was exactly the attitude at that time, to which I shall later 
refer as the logical-discursive-rational way. This segment, which together with the meditative-
mystical way, forms a unity in human understanding and being in the world, everywhere, be it 
"East" or "West"
, although somewhere one or the other of the two poles might be more 
suppressed or recognizable. 
   This onesidedness brought Europe to the situation where it hit the borders of what might 
be called "European" philosophical discourse. It is also reflected today, in a radical critique 
of European philosophy's dream of attaining a foundation for knowledge and an absolute basis 
for truth. Might it be the onesidedness of European philosophy which brought Nishitani Keiji 
to mourn for what he called the forgotten selves or the loss of the "spiritual basis of Japan"? (4) 
According to Nishitani, in his essays on nihilism, there was a solution from the decay of a 
spiritual core.(') Karl Lowith had stated, "the Europeans themselves had already ceased to 
believe in their own culture", which could be understood also as the insufficiency of the 
exclusively logical-discursive-rational way, which is being called into question today. 
   European philosophy evolved to Hegelian holism, a philosophy of change and becoming; 
the changes always taking place within a rational holistic system. When approaching the 
history of Japanese philosophy, we do not get much help from the notion of Truth in a 
rigorously Hegelian sense('). Even if we take into account his teleological hierarchy of 
writings, where the peak is reserved for phonetic writing of the alphabetic type, we see in it a 
stand which in its obsession with the letter diminishes any system that dose not correspond to 
this demand. We can read from it the possible consequences for Japanese philosophy. 
   So if we try to answer the opening quention, we might argue that "European" philosophy 
has been going through various phases of its definitions and redefitions, of searching for and 
losing its own identity. The last fifty years of encounters of Japanese and European 
philosophy, which would still include Nishida Kitaro as a living figure of world philosophy, 
brings into the debate the contemporary movement in philosophy that are opening new 
possibilities of verifications of thought and rationality and their basis and assumptions. This 
is also the moment which calls for a rethinking of the unity of the two inseparable ways to 
truth, that have been too often put into opposition to one another. 
   Although Nishida's early work "A Study of Good", has often been criticized as "naive"'), 
we should still read it as an important challenge to philosophy. Basides the recognized and 
legitimate way of searching for Truth, (logical-discursive-rational) he is arguing in the 
direction of "pure experience", which at the beginning of his work he defined as: "To 
experience means to know events precisely as they are. It means to cast away completely 
one's own inner workings, and to know in accordance with the events. Since people usually
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include some thought when speaking of experience, the word "pure" is here used to signify a 
condition of true experience itself without the addition of the least thought or reflection. For 
example, it refers to that moment of seeing a color or hearing a sound which occurs not only 
before one has added the judgment that this seeing or hearing relates to something external or 
that one is feeling this sensation, but before one has judged what color or what sound it is. 
Thus, pure experience is synonymous with direct experience. When one experiences directly 
one's conscious state there is as yet neither subject nor object, and knowledge and its object 
are completely united. This is the purest form of experience." (8) 
2) Orientalism and the division into logical-discursive-rational and meditative-
  mystical ways of approaching the truth 
   Since becoming acquainted with Said's work('), I have tried to follow the dynamics of the 
notion of "Orientalism". To the author of this controversial and inspiring work it primarily 
meant the way in which Europe communicated with the East (Orient) due to the special place 
which the Orient occupies in the Western (European) experience. This is to say, for Europe 
the Orient was not only a neighbor but has been (which for me in the wider sense of 
orientalist undertakings, is not only the past state of affairs) the world of its richest and oldest 
colonies. The Orient has also been the source of Europe's civilizations, languages and its 
rival in culture. The Orient has been one of the deepest and most repeated images of the 
Other. It helped Europe to define itself, as its counterpole and opposite. Apart from this 
dimension of the notion, I have been primarily interested in the distorted relationship, if it 
was put into practice, in the fields of religions or on the part of philosophy which deals with 
people's relationships to their existence and impermanence. In this sphere, the two forms of 
one's spiritural search more or less overlap each other. The origins of these distortions and 
the ways in which these ideas were nurtured are particularly interesting. 
   In the present essay I cannot give a full historical overview of these standpoints but 
shall, as a starting point, give Zaehner's notorious idea"), which has had a strong influence on 
the Euro-American intellectual, of a distinction between "Indian" (Eastern) and "Judaic" 
(Western) conception of people and the world. It drew from the fact that the Judaic accepts 
God as an objective reality whereas the Indian does not. On this basis he came to the 
conclusion that it is not possible to bridge the gaps between those two standpoints, since "the 
European mind is possessed by the concept of Truth, the concept that the ultimate realities 
can be known at least in part, and that the possession of this truth is so vital to man's well-
being. Such is not, and rarely has been, the Indian or Chinese way of seeing things." (11) 
Although in his statement Japan is not mentioned, it is instructive for the confrontation within 
the debate on Orientalism, which should not degenerate into an infinite discourse about "East" 
and "West." It would keep losing its philosophical essence until it became a pure political 
polemic trying to disqualify the mentioned authors. Therefore, in this paper, I deal with it as a 
phenomenon, recognizable in the majority of the perceptions of Japanese philosophical works 
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in Europe. 
   The notion in question is the phenomenon of mystical experience, which in Nishida's 
philosophical works is called pure experience, or as metioned in various religious works, the 
experience of the Absolute, Infinity, Nothingness. One could have a certain standpoint about 
the "naYvete" of Nishida's work, but not in relation to the notion of pure experience, which 
might have been inspired by William James and his work on mystical experience. 
   What follows from this are such questions as: 
- Does mystical experience exist? 
  If it does exist, what is its phenomenological definition? 
- Is it a philosophical concept? 
   The classical objections to it undermine the existence of mystical experience as a notion 
that would have any relevant position besides the knowledge acquired in a logical-discursive-
rational way. Faure ('o quotes less well-known classical orientalist statements, which are 
colored with explicitly western paternalistic standpoints toward Asians, especially Buddhist 
religious and philosophical orientations. In the light of further arguments the following four 
are particularly instructive: 
  "Europe... is destined by Providence to regenerate the Asians, whose intellectual and 
moral vigor seems exhausted.""' 
  "Buddhism has nothing in common with Christianity, which stands as high above it as 
European societies stand above Asian societies." "~ 
- "To claim that these (Asian) peoples are atheistic is the same imputation as if we said that 
they are anti-Cartesian; they are neither for nor against Descartes: they are true children. A 
child is neither an atheist nor a deist; he is nothing." (15) 
- "Buddhism can teach us nothing, and to follow its teaching would be disastrous to us. 
Notwithstanding its specious appearance, it is but a tissue of contradictions, and it is no 
calumny to say that, looked at closely, it is spiritualism without soul, virtue without duty, 
morality without liberty, charity without love, a world without nature and without God. What 
lesson can we draw from such teachings? And how much we should have to forget to become 
its disciples! How much lower we should have to descend in the scale of civilization!"") 
   The above statements, which are, as arguments, naive and offensive, were all written in 
the second half of the 19th century, at about the time when Nishi Amane had been so 
enthusiastically introducing Western learning and philosophy into Japan. They reflect the 
general atmosphere in Europe towards Japanese thought at that time.("' What we are 
confronted with here is not only ignorance and the degradation of important and much more 
venerable traditions, but also the anxiety of a researcher well trained in rational-logical 
discourse who appears to be quite frail when encountered with a theme which would demand a 
different strategy. As a result, various defensive mechanisms are mobilized. One of the 
possible defenses is also a kind of "smokescreen", formed from an effectively loaded debate 
on orientalism. The second possibility is a widely practised encapsulation, such as the one by
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which the official Church in Europe managed to turn the work of medieval mystics into a 
harmless phenomenon. At that time they were accused of heresy. Today their works are truly 
accepted into academic discussion but not into everyday religious pragmatics. 
   As an illustration, let us follow the thoughts of a philosopher") who intercedes on behalf 
of the revitalization of the mystical search: "We start from the supposition that the human 
being is opened and capable of- comprehending the infinite and therefore susceptible to 
mystical experience. Our presupposition is, that this openness enables the way into the world 
of mysticism / ... / . The mystical dimension of human nature is an anthropological fact, 
which determines humans as rational and free beings / ... / . We do not start primarily from 
a Christian understanding of mysticism / ... / . In its broader sense we understand the 
mystical dimension as a capacity of a human being to express himself in infinity, although it 
remains an unspoken word, which is precisely the peculiarity of the mystical: one is not able 
to express it or put it into concepts / ... / . The higher one rises, the less important the 
words are, said Dionysius Areopagite / ... / . It is a special experience, a pre experience, 
which takes place at the encounter with the unknown. Therefore it is very difficult to 
articulate it. `The word, which does not address the heart, does not have any weight', said 
Solzhenycin. That is why contemporary positivist-materialist logic is so empty." (19) This is the 
tradition on which the arguments for the introduction of positivism into Japan were grounded, 
and in regard to which the same author wrote the following statement: "Compte has thrown 
into the world his utopian thought about the immense role of positivism in the future: technics 
have been limited only to the inorganic field, in positivism this will be different, since by that 
time, technics will cease to be only geometrical, mechanical or chemical, but in the first place 
political and moral. (0) 
   We can doubt however, that Compte would fight so much for positivism in science, if 
today he could see the frightening effects of science and technics, which in their endeavors 
cannot give up their illusions about the elixir of immortality. 
   The authors that make claims for the legitimacy of mystical experience make different 
mistakes: they are limiting the genuineness of the mystical with the notion of a Christian God. 
Zaehner defended this standpoint very firmly. Even the more tolerant authors limit their 
standpoints with ~1). Tertulian: "Anima naturaliter christiana" and define: "Mysticism as a 
spiritual life, which expresses itself in a deeper and more direct connection with God." (~ 
   We might ask ourselves whether the God here is not just a symbol, a stenographic record 
for the unexpressible and unexplainable, which the mystical experience reveals to us. Faure 123) 
claims that "there is probably no way for Westerners to understand Asian religions from a 
purely traditional Indian, Chinese, or Japanese perspective, but perhaps there is no need to do 
so either." At this point he brings Bakhtin into the discussion and argues that "`exotopy', or 
more simply outsideness, is a powerful factor in understanding another culture, as long as it 
does not claim any transcendental privilege." The term "outsideness" is used here so that the 
Other can be left in its enclave and not be bothered about. The question remains as to which 
authority is entitled to draw the borders to such exotopies.
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    The familiar mistake is to understand ecstatic behavior as an element or reflection of 
mystical experience, since it impresses the surroundings with its bizarreness, but is in its 
essence only a disturbing admixture, or a picture of an inner fight between neurotic narcissism 
and a genuine aspiration for enlightenment. Many examples of individuals who had to pass 
through such a phase on their way to enlightenment are known from history (Theresa of Avila, 
Ramakrishana). There might be many more persons that deserve a thorough psychiatric 
analysis on suspicion of hysteric psychosis, but after real mystical insight one keeps the 
experience for oneself it subtly echoes in one's life for ever. 
   The problem becomes crucial for the Kyoto School and its relationship to European 
medieval mysticism. The encapsulation of European medieval mysticism is "endangered", 
paradoxically, from Japanese philosophers, who found the parts of those works with which 
they were able to draw parallels with Japanese Buddhism. This could be one of the reasons 
why the efforts to devalue the phenomenon of mystical experience can be directly derived 
from the orientalisation of certain philosophical streams in Japan, or even from the "reversed 
orientalism" practiced by some Japanese thinkers. Instead of making such attempts, we must 
be as precise as possible in the phenomenological definition of this subject, otherwise we are 
encountered with trends which could be described as "mystification of the mystical". In them 
the basic term "mysticism" is becoming more and more a pejorative one. " 
   Critical remarks directed to Suzuki, Nishida and Zen are, it seems, intended for mysticism 
or mystical experience of the world in general. If I try to summarize remarks critical of 
mystical experience, they can still not make it something nonexistent. Accepting it as a fact 
and trying to transfer it to the others, one should be aware that in its essence it can never be 
translated into logical-discursive-rational language. Such undertakings cannot even neglect as 
something outdated or naive the more than ninety-year-old description of the mystical given 
by William James. ~' 
   The phenomenon of mystical experience is therefore founded as a subjective reality, 
which in Nishida's philosophy is described as "pure experience", with its own energetic 
potential. We can only follow it according to the descriptions in everyday reality. The 
"enlightenments", against which much of "orientalization" is directed, are not reserved only for 
certain extraordinary persons, famous "mystics" of the "East" and "West" or even, as some 
authors try to generalize, the understanding of mystical experience as a psychopathological 
phenomenon. It is also not true that the inclination to the mystical was central just to certain 
religious orders, but is still essential as an orientation of "deep and solitary souls 
theologians, poets and other artists" (26). Although an artist or a poet in search of enlightenment 
reaches only `the trace of the shadow of the light of another world's magnificence', the sum of 
these aspirations gives the taste and the right measure to the often deceptive, rational and 
technological development, which makes the West so proud of itself. Was this the 
"devolopment" that Nishi was striving for, and that Nishida with his "pure experience" 
allegedly slowed down? 
   A wide range of "schools" (2I are brought into consideration when reflecting upon
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meditative ways and practice, which have been central parts of the philosophical (sic) 
undertakings of the Kyoto School. The fact that the meditative-mystical dimension was 
included does not make it less philosophical. All the various schools, which are not all 
necessarily well-formed religions, mobilize various techniques by which a mystical experience 
is enhanced. Sometimes, however, these might be just rudimentary or abortive, but still 
different from all that it is possible to experience by exclusively logical-discursive-rational 
ways. Nishida's philosophy and his "pure experience" teach us that both ways do not deny 
each other but, rather, stay as inseparable as yin and yang. 
Conclusion 
   If we try to evaluate the extent to which Japanese philosophy has been orientalized, we 
have to approach it from at least two angles. First, we should ask ourselves to what extent 
were the streams of thought that Nishi Amane searched for and found in the West decisive for 
Japanese philosophy. Nishi introduced the dimensions of European philosophy that he 
encountered at the time which were in line with the Hegelian praise of Reason and its role in 
the formation of culture,") with all the necessary consequences of such an exclusive decision. 
Besides the predicament of the European obsession with Reason, which has been decisive in 
this process, we should not overlook the Japanese philosophers themselves and their own 
relationship to the Japanese philosophical heritage. We could argue that the workable mixture 
of East and West which was supposed to serve the objectives of national strengthening can, in 
perspective, also lead towards weakening if the important resources are not taken into 
consideration. 
   Nishida's turning point is instructive, since he did depart from the pure speculative 
standpoint in the Hegelian sense. With his pure experience he opened up new sources for the 
energies that might have been blocked off by the accepted standards of rationality that Europe 
at the time had imposed on the field of philosophy. Nishida's interpreters have often reached 
the edge of reversed orientalism. Nishitani's statement that "Western thought is primarily 
rational, or, we may say, logical."" leads to his: "This represents an important element of the 
Western spirit that strikes me as very different from the spirit of the East.""' With its 
adoration for "Western Reason", such an argument unjustifiably draws the line between the 
two methods described above. On one side it deprives the so-called West of its non-logical 
traditions, and on the other one traps the East into the exclusively intuitive dimension 
("Rather than logical, rational, and methodical, it (the Eastern spirit) has been extremely 
intuitive".)(") By this statement he neglected all rich logical and dialectical traditions (3?' that 
could not have been placed anywhere but in the East. The traditions that have, besides the 
mystical-meditative path, followed and developed important methods of logic, dialectics and 
conceptual thinking. With statements like "The standpoint of learning - of reason and logic, 
of method, of rationalism - that has emerged in the philosophy and science of the West had 
been lacking in the East"'), not only has injustice been done to the non-European, in this
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case Asian philosophical traditions themselves, but they have also helped to develop the 
tradition of orientalization of Japanese philosophy, which culminated in reversed orientalism 
being practised by the Japanese thinkers themselves. 
   Finally we can return to Nishida's early work "A Study of Good" and to its "naivete". I 
am convinced that it was far from naive to introduce into the arena of philosophical debate 
"pure experience" as a potential legitimate tool in the search for truth about the human being 
and its place in the world. It would be naive to think that by doing this a synthesis had been 
accomplished, a synthesis between the two ways described above as logical-discursive-
rational and meditative-mystical. Philosophical debate up to the present has not been able to 
determine the advantage of either of them and Nishida's work can be understood not as a 
synthesis but as the unity of both that, like yin and yang, represent the unity in duality which 
is also a spiritual talisman and which should accompany us on the way to Truth. 
   Orientalism, understood as unjustified paternalism of the European towards the Asian 
tradition, has been the starting point of the paper. It is reflected also in the primacy of the 
logical-discursive-rational over the patterns connected with the meditative-mystical search. 
The process which started with the ways of asserting European philosophical heritage over 
the Asian ones outlined above has also developed an echo in the opposite direction and has in 
its own way deepened the European: Asian diastase, also partly due to the work of D.T. 
Suzuki. In the development of "reversed orientalism" each of the sides (European and 
Japanese in this case) has been defending its own standpoints (logical-discursive-rational vis 
a vis meditative-mystical) as the only relevant and liberating one. If one of each was trying to 
construct a synthesis of both, it has been clear from the beginning which is the dominant and 
stronger and which is the weaker and "less philosophical" one. 
   The described dilemma, however, is just an example of a controversial problem ("We" vis 
a vis the "Others"), which will be solved only when the position of dominance is transcended 
and they will be finally understood as mirrors of each other. The paradigm of yin and yang 
can serve us on the way to solving this problem. 
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